The development of the Internet has required the combined efforts of government agencies, universities, and private corporations. The system as we came to know it in the 1990s is to a great extent the result of the interaction of technical considerations and the peculiar interfaces among the public, private, and hybrid sectors. Yet the stories of the creation of the Internet by participants are largely of a system that sprung wholly from the private sector. In this study we explore the distance between creation stories and creation processes in this large-scale technical system. Our goal is twofold: to understand the attribution of public and private values by participants and to understand how public values influenced the design of the Internet. An embedded case study design is used with which we detect four types of stories that function as myths of contemporary culture, which constitute a denial of public value in the creation of the Internet: (a) appeal to the heroic individual, (b) substitution of professional ethics for a public service ethic, (c) use of private sector myths by the public sector, and (d) appeal to entrepreneurs and the primacy of the private sector and civil society. In private, insiders tell stories about successful public managers in the implementation of the Internet. They have not received much diffusion and interpret the result as a realization of democratic values. The intent of the government to create a new marketplace, that is, ''cyberspace,'' is suggested as the peculiar form of public value created with the Internet. These stories highlight by contrast the difficulty in portraying the value created by public managers when the role of the government is enabling and indirect.
Success is supposed to have a thousand parents. The truth of this adage can be seen in numerous accounts of the development of the Internet-with one notable and important exception. Internet creation stories are littered with the cultural icons of our age. At center stage are nerdy computer geeks who blossom into dot.com entrepreneurs, iconoclastic hackers, computer professionals, or, perhaps, a bit of all three. Supporting this cast are the ''suits'' (businesspeople, venture capitalists, and corporate finance types) and the ''mavens'' (senior computer scientists working in universities or research laboratories). The missing actor in this cast is the public official or, in the common vernacular, the bureaucrat.
This omission is startling given the significant role the public sector played in the creation and development of the Internet. A recent report from the National Research Council (NRC) recounts the history of computer research and notes: ''In fact, the Webnow considered to be a major driver of the way society accesses and views information-is the result of numerous projects in computer networking, mostly funded by the federal government, carried out over the last 40 years. The projects produced communications protocols that define the format of network messages, prototype networks, and application programs such as browsers '' (1999, 169) .
However, as we will see below, the majority of the popular and academic histories written about the Internet seem reluctant to identify the public sector as a major resource or inspiration. It is as if recounting the truth of the public sector's role somehow spoils the naturalness of the development of the technology. This trend is seen even in the abnegation of public sector officials regarding their roles. Agency officials are more likely to point to their identity as computer professionals when discussing the Internet. Or they downplay their involvement as simply a source of funds and a little advice.
Why is there this denial of public value? Why do we not celebrate the ways in which the different sectors came together to produce this marvelous class of technology? Why do we insist on fashioning recent technological history as a purely private sector affair? It is tempting to dismiss this all as an accident of history whereby the benefits of the Internet accrue at a point in time when conservatism is the dominant political perspective and the private sector is more popular than the public sector. However, while acknowledging the insight from such a view, we argue that the denial of public value, at least in the case of the Internet, comes from a far more complex interaction of social and cultural forces. On the one hand, the evidence from interviews, the news, and government reports shows the forms and sources of the denial of public value for the individual participants. Their accounts and arguments reveal patterns that we describe in this article. On the other hand, at a deeper theoretical level, we suggest that the creation of public value by public managers in connection with the Internet does not fit the stereotypical counterpoint of private versus public that pervades much of the public discourse about the role of government. Moore (1995) and others (Kirlin 1996; Van Deth and Scarborough 1995; Van Wart 1998) have suggested that public managers create public value. Bozeman (2002) has indicated that public success and failure lie along a dimension orthogonal to market success and failure. These perspectives help us understand the predicament of public managers and the search for legitimacy that is understood intuitively but lacks backing in established public discourse. The denial of the public role in creating public value by participants in the implementation and deployment of the Internet is entirely consistent with the diagnosis that it is much more difficult to offer an argument for public value creation than for the efficient operation of markets (Bozeman 2002; Kuttner 1997 ). In the case of technological innovations with such significant economic and social impacts as the Internet, these difficulties are exacerbated.
FORMS AND SOURCES OF DENIAL OF PUBLIC VALUE
We explore four alternative forms of the denial of public value in the Internet creation stories. They include the following:
Appeal to the Heroic Individual-These are stories that illustrate the role of individual scientists in advancing the frontier of knowledge.
Substitution of Professional Ethics for a Public Service Ethic-These are stories in which people appeal to the canons of their profession and the role of the professional community as the basis for developing this technology. Here we may see a professional service ethic be substituted for a public service ethic.
Use of Private Sector Myths by the Public Sector-These stories are promoted by the public sector itself to advance the development of the technology. Here an agency will eschew the public dimensions of the technology and emphasize the importance of transitioning the technology to private sector governance and maintenance. This might be done for reasons of politics, that is, selling the idea to Congress or the president. It also might be done in order to maintain coalition support from universities and businesses in the development of the technology. In any case, the proper role of government is as a follower and not a leader.
Appeal to Entrepreneurs and the Primacy of the Private Sector and Civil Society-These stories exalt the role of technology creators and entrepreneurs that embed the values of freedom and democracy in new technology. The primacy of the private sector is specifically small business and the user/consumer as potential businessperson or publisher. The public sector is looked at with skepticism and called on to keep its commitment to the protection of individual rights.
The combination of these trends creates a condition where there is no voice to articulate the achievements, or even the role, of the public sector.
The prevailing political climate during the 1990s sparked a passionate, though somewhat sporadic, defense of the public sector. In recent years public management scholars and practitioners alike have been alarmed at efforts to ''hollow out'' the American state and the excesses of demolition politics (Milward 1996; Rhodes 1994) . Arguments for an active public sector have been sharpened through renewed explorations defining the public interest (Frederickson 1997 ) and the creation of public value (Bozeman 2002; Moore 1995) . Others have taken aim at the market failure and government failure theories (Lowry 1998; Zerbe and McCurdy 1999) , which have served as a foundation of the current conservative critique of the public sector. In a more pragmatic vein, accountability theory has taken a more central place as agencies wrestle with the challenges of maintaining legitimacy and control in an era of privatization (Johnston and Romzek 1999; Kearns 1996) .
Although these defenses have been active, earnest, and useful, they shed little light on the nature of the current antipathy toward the public sector. A more direct exploration of this topic has been made through historical studies. For example, it is argued that all we are experiencing is a return to the normal American culture that historically has had a deep suspicion of the power of government (Kuttner 1997) . In this light, the prevailing rhetoric is merely a correction for the exuberant embrace of public action that occurred with the development of the welfare state. Vogel (1996) offers a different perspective, arguing that suspicion of government is the norm because the power of corporate America developed before large-scale government. The argument goes further to suggest that because governmental power was developed to temper the excesses of private sector power, antipathy is the natural state of affairs. Still others have made a more individualistic appeal, arguing that the increasing prosperity of the modern era has diminished our interest in or desire for a strong public sector and civic engagement (Fukuyama 1999) .
The strength of these historical arguments is that they offer a frame for exploring the shift in our attitudes toward government. We have moved from an era in the 1920s and 1930s when government service was the highest calling to an era in which government service is seen as a second-class calling for the uninspired, those lacking ambition, or the highly idealistic.
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Historical arguments have their limitations. They tend to privilege an institutional ideal of sector to explain our preference, or lack thereof, for public action. As a consequence, the value of the public sector is understood through competition with other sectors (private or not-for-profit) and the institutional ideals that govern them. We argue in this article that the denial of public value is a bit more complicated and comes from a wider variety of social forces and the lack of a legitimate public discourse to accompany the complementarities in the success of both the government and the market in creating value for society. To illustrate this argument the history of the Internet is explored. Here is a sociotechnical system that was sponsored and developed almost entirely through public sector organizations and with public resources. Yet when we look at accounts of the creation of the Internet there is little that marks this as a public endeavor.
The Role of Stories in Organizations and Public Policy
The role of stories in organizational life has long been recognized, and the value of analyzing stories told by organizations' members as a way to probe the culture and ''sense making'' in them has been established (Boje 2001; Hummel 1991; Maynard-Moody and Kelly 1993; Weick 1995) . The importance of stories has also been established in public policy (Roe 1994) . In both cases, the key insight is that stories in use by organization members and policy actors have effects on the course of organizational life and policy decision making. Further, these effects can be traced to inherent properties of the stories rather than their empirical adequacy as descriptions of reality. As Roe puts it, ''These stories often resist change or modification even in the presence of contradicting empirical data, because they continue to underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for decision making in the face of high uncertainty, complexity and polarization' ' (1994, 2) . In other words, stories ''do something'' in the context of organizational life and policy making that is not simply conveying the facts of the matter. We claim that the stories about the origin of the Internet analyzed in this article shed light on the issue of the creation of public value by 1 For example, each year we run into students interested in studying the public sector who receive strong parental pressure not to pursue such an unproductive line of study. On the one hand, this can work to our benefit. After all, there is nothing quite so attractive to a young person as knowledge forbidden by a parent. But it is also odd to witness the ferocity of the conviction among many parents that public affairs is a path that might permanently injure the career trajectory of their children. the government in this country. As the analysis presented in this article shows, these Internet stories have the features of so many popular American stories: heroic individuals, the triumph of ingenuity over skepticism, the greatness of technological achievement, and the villainous role of bureaucratic government. What the nature of these stories suggests is that government action that is not easily captured in a story of this sort will face much greater difficulty in gaining legitimacy. At times the government, or a prominent government figure, can become the hero of these stories, as in the case of leading the nation in war, for example. However, this is much more difficult when the role of government is indirect, creating spaces for action and enabling and facilitating activities by other sectors of society.
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In this study, we have not collected stories from within the boundaries of specific organizations. Rather, we are more interested in the attribution of value to public sector activities made in stories that are in public circulation and have been for some time. This reduces the degree of control we have over the data to connect the content of the stories to specific public sector entities or activities. However, the diversity of sources of these stories, the length of time during which they have proliferated, and the various ways in which they converge on the point of denying the value of public contributions to the Internet suffice to make our point.
3 Only one set of stories, the use of private sector myths by the public sector, involves stories that public managers themselves tell. In this case, as we discuss later, they seem to be trying to make sense of the paradox of public involvement to enhance the chances of private sector gain. All four sets of stories seem to work as myths of our culture, in the sense anthropologists give the term (Eliot 1976) . They are very stylized and simple stories that attempt to capture something that is fundamental for understanding what it means to live in a world with the Internet. Technology is widely recognized as a source of modern myth (see Eliade 1976) . In these stories, the perception of a profound transformation of the world by Internet technology is associated with the role of various heroes.
The widespread diffusion of stories such as these, on a very prominent case of value creation by the public sector, raises several questions regarding the role of a theory of public value in legitimizing public sector action. On the one hand, the actual creation of value through the Internet provides strong support for this notion and illustrates it very clearly (Bozeman 2002) . On the other hand, much public value comes along in an indirect or catalytic manner and through a rather invisible process that may seem beside the point if emphasized in a specific public policy. Therefore, it may be more powerful as an academic theory to explain government action but rather limited as a pragmatic tool to help in legitimizing specific activities, the objectives of which appear to fit better in stories that push the public sector to the background.
The forms and sources of the denial of public value are explored further in the next section. The four categories of stories have been inferred from narrations found in technical publications about the Internet, and others have been found in public documents such as congressional hearings in which funding decisions were considered, journalistic coverage of Internet development in major media outlets, views expressed by major participants in 2 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for the insightful comments that helped us articulate this point.
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Sources include many types of publication, including scholarly journals, government documents, trade journals, journalism, and oral communication in interviews by us and others. The stories have proliferated from the late 1980s to the present.
personal interviews, and analysis of Internet development in communications and information technology trade journals. We identify the major components of each story type. Another section draws on further evidence of the development of the Internet in order to contrast it with these accounts and show the denial effects. By doing so, the selection framework underlying them will become clearer, and we attempt to construct what might be a plausible public ''counterstory.'' In a final section, we offer an explanation for the particular forms of the denial of public value in the context of the deliberate intent by the government of creating new markets as public value.
PRIVATE VERSIONS OF A PUBLIC NET Appeal to the Heroic Individual
The stories in this category are very simple and focus on the individuals who are considered the inventors of the main technical components of the Internet as a specific technology. This is the perspective adopted by most publications that actually aim at presenting a history of the Internet, in either summarized or full form. The Internet is conceptualized as a fairly self-contained technological object. As such, it was conceived and perfected in clearly delimited stages by identifiable individuals and their sheer brainpower.
Illustrative of this genre is the book by two journalists, Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late (1996). They credit several individuals for key pieces of the system. Robert Taylor, the director of the Information Processing and Technology Office of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), oversaw the implementation of the ARPA Network (ARPANET) beginning in the late 1960s. J. C. R. Licklider and Dave Englebart are visionaries who anticipated the information utility that the computer network finally embodied. In the mid-1960s Paul Baran and Donald Davies were original contributors to the notion of packet switching, the alternative to circuit switching used in telephony that underlies computer networking such as the Internet. Len Kleinrock was the professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, who developed the mathematics of queuing theory needed to implement Baran's and Davies's ideas. In the early 1970s Robert Kahn and Vinton Cerf invented the first version of Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), the dominant protocol that enabled the interconnection of heterogeneous networks. They later occupied various positions in government agencies and industry related to further development of the Internet. This is a common perspective on the development of technology that mirrors a similar view of science in which the great ideas of great minds are all that need to be reported to understand its history. By definition, all the relevant events occur in the private realm. The role of the public sector is only to acknowledge the merits of such great individuals and afford them the support they need to pursue their ideas because it will obviously result in the greater public good. The interesting stories in this view surround the early periods of obscurity of the heroic individuals in which the authorities, in universities or government, either did not recognize or underestimated the importance of the contributions they were about to make. Alternatively, the excessive attention paid to some contributors to the detriment of other important inventors becomes a common theme in these accounts. In the case of the Internet, Robert Taylor is said to have received little recognition for his role in the implementation of the network. An article in the Los Angeles Times (11 October 1999) reporting on the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the ARPANET quotes J. Strother Moore of the University of Texas as saying: ''In my opinion, Bob Taylor is not getting enough credit. I rarely see his name in the newspaper when the history of the Internet is discussed. He, perhaps more than anyone, deserves the credit for the vision that created the Internet.'' There is no role for government to play in the development of technology in this perspective. It is, by implication, the realm of lesser figures who are stretched in their responsibility to recognize and support the geniuses who will create what the public interest needs and only they know. The gifted individuals may work in an environment created by government to meet some of its objectives. However, for the most part, the interest of the story lies in showing that the government's goal was not really the wisest choice or was rather limited, especially in hindsight (such as the goal of surviving a nuclear attack). In contrast, the special gifts of our heroes produced surprising results that benefited the public much more than the government objectives could, even when achieved.
The general structure of these stories has three main components: (1) the heroic individual inventor or genius, (2) a set of obstacles to be overcome, and (3) a moral of the story stating that intelligent individuals triumph over the darkness of ignorance and backwardness when they are allowed to work freely, without undue interference by clumsy administrators. The obstacles constituting the second component of the story are of two sorts. First, they point to the technological challenges and problems that the inventors faced and solved. Second, they highlight the lack of vision of a rather undefined category of higher-up administrators who should have been keener to support the inventors. This lack of vision also conspired against giving these individuals proper recognition. So now, as the Internet has proven to be a success, the record must be set straight and credit must be given where it is due. In the end, the inventor-heroes triumphed in spite of long odds.
This view does not deny that public value was created by these activities. Rather, it denies that the government and its agencies are a source of, or a legitimate leader in, achieving public value through this technological innovation. There is a ''marketplace of ideas'' with which the government must not interfere if the public interest is to be achieved. The public gets more value if the creative heroes are free to perform their wonders.
Substitution of Professional Ethics for a Public Service Ethic
The second set of stories attributes most of the important developments of the Internet, both technical and social, to an ''Internet community'' of creator-users linked to the ARPANET for the first decade or so of its existence. This was a community of professionals in computer science who specialized in the development of networks that were important for the diffusion of Internet technology.
This perspective has its most complete presentation in Peter Salus's (1995) book. 4 It is generally rich in the details and anecdotes of engineers and programmers at work. The stories are full of detailed information, including dates and names of participants; internal documents; and related technological devices, programs, and systems, which are of course a very important part of the history. They illustrate what actual participants advocated at 4 See also the introductory chapter in Comer 1991, chapter 1 of Lynch and Rose 1993 , and the historical notes in Malamud 1993, among others. This is a history told by insiders. Salus's book, for instance, includes a diversion after each of its twenty-four chapters that reproduces an insider's joke about the network or a poetic celebration of the network by its designers. some of the important events in the development of the global Internet. Two of these events are the international networking standards debates and the succession of communityspecific networks that proliferated between the creation of the ARPANET and the unification of the global Internet.
The standards debates took place between the largely European-sponsored Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) standards versus the American TCP/IP. The latter was connected to the activity of the group of researchers working on protocols or network applications and who could trace their credentials to ARPANET activities. The former was the product of the policies and decisions of communications corporations, governments, and international institutions. These stories describe the process as one of technical prowess and business acumen versus the authoritarianism of a sclerotic bureaucracy (Salus 1995, 123) . Many of these authors actually participated indirectly in the standards debates, mainly by lobbying for the TCP/IP. So they focus very specifically on the aspects of this process that were closer to their professional interests. The technical deliberations occurred in relatively small groups that drafted recommendations for technical standards. Larger issues of an institutional or political economy nature were not among those they were concerned with. The transborder data flow problem, among others that imposed conditions on the communication policies of international and some national organizations, is not selected for treatment.
In the end, the technological embodiment of their community, namely TCP/IP, triumphed over OSI because of a more sound engineering process. It clearly reflects the notion that sound professional criteria must override policy considerations originating in bureaucratic entities, especially government. Again, in this view, the public is better served by good technology without government interference.
During the early 1980s the expansion of networking took place via the implementation of networks for specific constituencies, such as Computer Science Network (CSNET), Because It's Time Network (BITNET), and later National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET).
5 Prior to this period, in the mid-1970s, there were a few commercial ventures in data communication with packet-switching networks, such as TELENET and TYMNET, that offered services to public and private organizations. However, they did not have great commercial success. Thinking about ''information infrastructures'' began to take shape at this time as well. 6 However, the stories in this set downplay the role of these events and highlight the technical genealogy of the networks that gave birth to the global Internet. With this interpretation, all the consequences of the network technologies are contained in their technical features. And most of today's features, such as decentralized management and blurring of jurisdictional boundaries, are attributed to visions that the technical community had earlier. In this view, there was no real contribution to the implementation of the 5 CSNET was a computer network created by a group of computer scientists led by Larry Landweber with an National Science Foundation (NSF) grant to serve the academic community of computer scientists (those without Department of Defense grants and access to ARPANET). BITNET was a ''store-and-forward'' computer network created by two university administrators at Yale and New York University using standard International Business Machines (IBM) equipment. NSFNET was the computer network initially designed to allow access to NSF-sponsored supercomputer centers but then became the catalyst of the global Internet. For a complete list of ''constituency-specific'' networks in existence in the 1980s, see Quartermann 1990. 6 The term information infrastructure was already in use for almost a decade in information policy circles before its first uses with the Internet as the referent. See Branscomb 1982. Internet by the government entities that built the constituency-specific networks. They were mainly incidental applications of a technology that was already on its own development course.
The structure of these stories has the following features. First, they construct the identity of a community of protagonists: the network community or ''Internet community.'' This is done by making the technological networking events coextensive with the professional community achievements. Second, the community is faced with adversity that tries to deny their right to exist as the ''bearers of the true Internet.'' The international bureaucrats and multinational corporations are the main culprits that try to create networks through bureaucratic procedures. A networking professional who was employed in a federal agency represents this sentiment:
We network folks were there first, and then suddenly all the supercomputer people, the software people, and all the other people came along and said, ''Me too, me too.'' And OSTP [the Office of Science and Technology Policy] decreed that there would be a unified program: the software, the hardware, the basic research, and the network. And oddly enough, when that program was first produced, the first documents, the ones that came out in November '87, if you look at the funding profiles you'll see that, although networking was sort of the prime mover of the whole thing, it had the smallest piece of the budget. The third element is the moral of the story, that technical sophistication and excellence always triumph over bureaucratic imperialism.
In sum, this perspective reflects a deep sense of professional identity that is involved with the development of the network. When it grew out of the confines of this community, it was used to establish the legitimacy of its professional credentials before the larger audience.
8 As a result, the role and mandate of government had to be minimized in order to highlight the contribution of the community to the public good.
Use of Private Sector Myths by the Public Sector
The stories in this set show that the ''divesting'' of public value or underrepresentation of the contribution of government agencies and policies was actively promoted from inside government agencies. The more the Internet grew and demonstrated its potential, the greater the effort to shift attention to business. As is well known, as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives and later in the U.S. Senate, Al Gore had taken a great interest in the future of telecommunications and the development of the Internet (U.S. Congress 1983a Congress , 1983b Congress , 1983c Congress , 1985a Congress , 1985b . When Clinton and Gore won the presidential election, the Internet figured prominently in their pronouncements about the future of the American economy. They were eager to show that, in this area, government would limit itself to making things as easy and attractive as possible for the Internet, and its associated technologies, to become the next ''gold rush'' of American business. During the first year of the Clinton administration, it issued the report The National Information Infrastructure: An Agenda for Action (U.S. Executive Office of the President 1993), in which it declared its commitment to certain basic values such as ''universal service'' but seemed to be aiming at 7 Interview by the authors. All interviews were conducted between February and July 1995. The subjects wish to remain anonymous. 8 A fuller presentation of this process can be found in Rogers 1998. the maximization of the opportunities of corporate giants in media, computer, and communications business (see Markoff 1993) . The role of government would be to create funding programs for underdeveloped aspects of the infrastructure, such as K-12 education, so that industry could cater to those needs through government subsidies to schools via the states or localities. The great virtue of government in this area was interpreted as opening markets that business would then exploit. In the development process, government was merely following the lead of industry and its scintillating innovations-so much so that the very notion of the public interest in this framework was perilously vague.
In the words of a director of one of the NSF supercomputer centers, with long service experience in government agencies, government was not really involved, and then Al Gore came around with this legislation which took several years to get passed, and there was no initiative from Washington then either. There were just individual initiatives like NSF putting money into supercomputing centers or building a network, and then there was finally this big legislation, the Gore bill, that was passed, but it had no money in it. And so what you've defined to be the HPCC [High-Performance Computing and Communications] initiative might be the scope of activities referred to by the Gore bill or might be the larger scope of activities by the federal agencies. In any case, it's almost irrelevant. The Washington activities, and this is a very important point, and this is probably the most important thing I can tell you, the Washington activities, whether you are talking about the Gore bill or the HPCC initiative, any of these other things that have ever come out of Washington in the last ten years on the subject are all reflections of what's going on in the field, they are not the initiators. The reason for the supercomputing initiative, if you call it an initiative at NSF to establish the centers, was not really any decision in Washington. The reason was that the technology had progressed with great leaps forward and NSF realized that it needed to act in reaction to this fact that the technology had progressed. The same thing is true of the entire development of the network and all the high-performance computers and so on; the real germ of innovation is not Washington, it's Silicon Valley, it's Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin, it's San Diego, it's Illinois, whatever. And all of these different federal initiatives, federal legislation and so on, federal organizations to deal with high-performance computing, they are all merely reflections of reality, they are not generators of reality. This individual can be characterized as a government technologist who participated in various key developments in his capacity as a member of the technological community and government agencies. It is interesting to see his perception of his own role as an outsider, one that is by no means uncommon among government personnel who manage technological projects or systems. 10 The commitment not to build large systems owned or operated by government seemed to be complete. Everybody was convinced that it was the way to go. Another government technologist agreed that ''managing large projects is one of the things that gets Washington into trouble all the time. '' 11 And yet another thought that ''this is a good example of how federal government support works well. It funds the leading edge early on and then gets out of the way. '' 12 9 Interview by the authors.
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The interviewee cited in the previous section, a networking professional who was employed in a federal agency, is another example.
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Interview by the authors.
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The structure of these stories also has an identity-forming component but differs from the previous set in that the storyteller is not a member of the group identified as the heroes. The government managers that tell them point away from themselves to another group in the private sector. Private sector technologists and entrepreneurs are the ''good guys'' who do things properly and are truly responsible for the good things we have. The identity of the storytellers' group is fashioned by implication, negatively, not as enemies but as ascetic servants who should not aspire to something that is not theirs to claim. The second feature, presenting the adversity the protagonists face, is precisely the potential for wrongdoing that is created when public managers dare step outside their proper boundaries. The third feature or moral of the story is that we should look up to the private sector creators and by implication appreciate the ascetic virtue of public managers who mind their own business.
In these cases, the denial of the role of government is consistent, and the belief that there is no legitimate leadership role for government to play is often expressed. Government, in this view, must be a good follower, adapting to a reality created by others.
Appeal to Entrepreneurs and the Primacy of the Private Sector and Civil Society
This set of stories is very popular and is told by many different types of people, including historians, policy analysts, journalists, and some technologists, among others. It could be called the ''democratic,'' or even ''anarchist,'' history of the Internet. It portrays the development of computer networks as ''user driven.'' All the instances of network use that were not anticipated by the designers count as evidence for the validity of this view, which interprets the movement toward ''internetworking'' as a movement toward democratic decentralization, empowering individuals and grassroots communities.
A version of this perspective is found, for example, in Howard Rheingold's bestseller, The Virtual Community (1993). 13 Referring to a group of computer scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology working on early versions of ARPANET technology, Reinghold writes, ''The earliest users of CMC [computer-mediated communication] systems also were the people who built the first CMC systems; as users as well as designers of this thinking tool, they were reluctant to build in features that took power away from individual users, so they designed a degree of user autonomy into the system that persists in the architecture of cyberspace today' ' (1993, 72 ). Salus's (1995) history, mentioned in relation to the second set of stories, terms the second stage of Internet history, coinciding with its second decade of existence, an ''application-driven'' stage. Events were dominated by the development of new applications rather than the design and expansion of the basic technology. Applications embody the goals and aspirations of users who are the user-designers of the new Internet. 14 Much of the press coverage of networking issues tends to push this interpretation of its history. For example, in a special issue of Time magazine published in 1995, Steward Brand wrote an article under the title ''We Owe It All to the Hippies' ' (1995) . Following Steven Levy's book Hackers (1984) , he advances the thesis that the ''hacker'' spirit, which comes from the egalitarian and antiestablishment values of the 1960s hippies, drives the entire computer revolution. About the network, Brand says: ''In the years since Levy's book, a fourth generation of revolutionaries has come to power. Still abiding by the Hacker 13 Chapter 3, subtitled ''The Accidental History of the Net,'' is a good example. 14 See Salus 1995, 229. Ethic, these tens of thousands of netheads have created myriad computer bulletin boards and a nonhierarchical linking system called Usenet. At the same time, they have transformed the Defense Department-sponsored ARPANET into what has become the global digital epidemic known as the Internet' ' (1995, 56) . Philip Elmer-Dewitt, who covered Internet-related events for Time and has written several articles, also typifies this perspective when he says: ''One factor fueling the Internet's remarkable growth is its resolutely grass-roots structure . . . [it] is open (nonproprietary) and rabidly democratic. No one owns it. No single organization controls it. It is run like a commune with 4.8 million fiercely independent members (called hosts). It crosses national boundaries and answers to no sovereign. It is literally lawless '' (1995, 9) . 15 One of the main points of these stories is that the values of freedom and creativity of the user-designer-entrepreneurs are somehow built in or embedded in the technology of the Internet. It is a technology of freedom. 16 Sometimes it is a strong statement suggesting that trying to control it is foolhardy, as Elmer-Dewitt's quote above would indicate. Other times it is a programmatic intent or vision that must be respected, as Reinghold argues: ''As big government and big business line up to argue about which information infrastructure would be better for citizens, it is the right of the citizens to remind elected policymakers that these technologies were created by people who believed that the power of computer technology can and should be made available to the entire population, not just to a priesthood' ' (1993, 70) . They argue that the network is intrinsically decentralizing (equated with democratizing) and user oriented in nature, a feature that descends directly from the informality and collaborative style of network management in the early days. Telephone monopolies, the previous paradigm of communication for ordinary citizens, are a favorite target of ridicule for their hierarchical and bureaucratic, impersonal nature.
These stories are present in the arguments over policy definitions for the future information infrastructure. They explicitly defend a more democratic or grassroots agenda over against a hierarchical, large corporation-dominated infrastructure. In this picture, government is seen as an ally of big business because it has similar concerns for security, which are often in tension with allowing complete freedom of expression and access to the content of the network.
Entrepreneurialism takes on a radical meaning in this framework because the technology seems to emerge from the interaction of rabid individualists who are building their future through technology and, rather than go each in his or her own separate direction, converging on this new life plane: cyberspace. The criticism of big business does not mean a rejection of business values. Quite the opposite is true. Many prominent businesspeople were leading activists contributing to the lore propagated with these stories. Mitch Kapor, the creator of important business software packages, is also the founder of the Electronic Freedom Frontier and a model in these accounts. Bill Gates is depicted as a traitor who has forgotten his small business and programmer beginnings and no longer represents the creativity and freedom-enhancing values of computer-based communication. As a matter of fact, Microsoft's delay in appreciating the importance of the Internet is used to support this idea. And, somewhat paradoxically, ''hackers'' are legitimized by their contribution to moneymaking enterprises with their skills. With the continual probing and challenging of computer systems, they help to improve their design.
15
This view is also found in some academic articles. See, for example, Hart, Reed, and Bar 1992. 16 This is an expression popularized by Ithiel de Sola Pool.
The structural components of these stories identify the main group as ''freedom fighters'' who are opening the doors for a brighter democratic future based on high technology. The adversaries are the representatives of large hierarchical organizations who wish to co-opt the network to preserve their authority and move closer to the reign of ''big brother,'' be it government or big business. The moral of the story is that true freedom is achieved through a blend of democracy and high-tech capitalism that focuses on the desires of the user/consumer. Large hierarchical organizations are the enemy in this perspective. If organizations must exist, they should be completely flat, decentralized, and high tech.
MAIN FEATURES OF THE PUBLIC ROLE IN INTERNET DEVELOPMENT What the Stories Leave Out
By contrasting these stories with a scholarly interest in what actually happened, we see a general pattern of selectivity: the focus is chosen to exalt the importance of the heroes or ''good guys'' in realizing some core value presenting a partial picture of the events and their significance. These stories are a true representation of what the storytellers believe is at stake even if they do not satisfy more objective historiographic criteria. In order to appreciate the way these stories work and the nature of their selectivity, we point out in this section what seem to be the most significant aspects of the history of Internet evolution that are not included or seem to be misconstrued in these stories.
The first two sets of stories have a significant drawback in the almost complete lack of contextual connections. There is hardly any reference to the institutions the participants belonged to, be they individual inventors or members of the professional community, or to the policies that shaped many projects. This makes the explicit or implicit interpretation provided for certain important events in the overall process highly implausible. For example, the role of ARPA program managers, who are known to be closely involved in the technical specification and development of sponsored projects, is ignored even though they were responsible for articulating the problem of computer resource management for which the ARPANET was a solution. Similarly, the international standards debates were about the rules of international commerce as they relate to data exchange and their impact on commercial competitiveness and the balance of power. They were not just about the relative merits of technical solutions to computer communication problems.
The willingness of public managers to shift credit away from themselves and government generally is a systematic attempt to decontextualize technological development. The use of government contracts awarded to academic engineers and scientists surely creates some ambiguity about the realm in which the participants belonged. The key here is that there was no single bureaucratic entity that had command and control of the development of the system. And it was important to these managers that they not create the perception of such centralized control by government. However, taking into account the looseness with which institutional boundary issues were handled, there was an effective responsibility for the evolution of the system that was carried out by these government managers.
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This is clearly true of the ARPANET, but more important, it is especially true of the development of the transition to a global general-purpose network during the 1980s and early 1990s. For example, government technical managers designed the architecture of the backbone of the network that achieved this transition. And most technical specifications for future development were decided and carried out by this group, effectively establishing the rules for private participation in the period that followed (Rogers 1998 ).
The last set of stories featuring the formative role of grassroots network users exaggerates the ''bottom-up'' importance of the dynamics of network experimentation and standardization that occurred in the early Network Working Group and the Requests for Comments and with the formation a few years later of the Internet Activities Board (later Internet Architecture Board) and its task forces (Lynch and Rose 1993, 15ff) . Those events hardly justify remarks like ''For something that has spread with all the forethought of kudzu, the Internet isn't half bad. . . . How much better a network could you create if you actually planned it? '' (1995, 58) by Begley and Rogers in a Newsweek article. The actual dynamic of the ''Internet community'' that has been part of these incipient institutions is an interesting phenomenon to study and may be a rather remarkable departure from widely held expectations about telecommunications networks. But the informality of it all should not be exaggerated. All their activities were well within the expected performance of members of government and university research teams. Generally speaking, we tend to sympathize with the democratic values represented in these stories. However, as a historical account of the Internet, it does not work.
The accounts in the last set of stories have the virtue of being less deterministic about technology than the others. They appreciate the role of other communities rather than the designers alone in shaping technologies and defining their attributes (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987; Bijker and Law 1992) . However, they often reify the category ''users.'' For example, it is applied to the computer scientists who exchanged e-mail on the ARPANET during the early 1970s, the high-energy physicists who are said to have extended the network to access their supercomputers, the university administrators who implemented BITNET, the readers of news on USENET, and the members of bulletin boards all over the place. They then go on to draw the conclusion that it is all one giant democratizing process.
Further, the role of institutions, especially the participation of government agencies, and political economy factors are not well accounted for in this perspective either. For example, Elmer-Dewitt writes in one of his articles: ''The government is the dark horse in the race to the information highway. It got into the business almost by accident: thanks to Gore's lobbying during the 1980s, it funded the fiber-optic links that form the backbone of Internet, the sprawling computer grid that is for students, scientists and the Pentagon what Prodigy and Compuserve are for ordinary computer users '' (1993, 54) . This is clearly a gross misunderstanding of the role of the government in networking development and evolution. As we already established in describing this set of stories, this perspective is generally suspicious not only of government but also of the world of large corporations that would have the power to impose their will on the development of the Internet.
Accounting for the Public Role
The obvious contribution of the government to the development of the Internet was the funding, via grants and contracts, for the various stages of R&D involved in the creation of packet switching, the networking protocols, and other related systems. This much is almost always acknowledged even in the most radical ''anarchist'' stories of the evolution of the Net. One of the most popular, and inaccurate, versions of this role of government maintains that, in the context of the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DOD) wanted to develop a computer network system that could survive a nuclear attack and that the result of this goal was packet switching and the Internet. As a matter of fact, in the early 1960s DOD did commission a study carried out by Paul Baran (1964) at RAND that conceived of a rationale for data-communication systems that had that sort of fault tolerance. However, the study published in 1964 did not lead to the implementation of any network, and it did not contain the solution to the key technological problems in such a system, that is, the basis for trafficcontrol algorithms. The report contained little more than a specification or an agenda for development rather than the invention of a new technology. In sum, the tale of nuclearresistant communications is only a misleading partial truth.
The book-length treatment of the origins of the Internet by Hafner and Lyon (1996) , Where Wizards Stay Up Late, sets the record straight on this matter. It presents the account by some of the actors themselves that the ARPANET, the first actual packet-switching network, was created to share expensive computer resources bought with DOD ARPA funds but dispersed among contractors and grantees all over the country. In order to understand the role of the ARPANET in the development of the Internet, we must note, first, that it was at the same time an experimental program and a production or service system. Because the technologies of networking were new, its implementation required the solution to problems that were detected as the system grew. All the users of the network were for many years also the providers of input that shaped the next version of the system. At the same time, real computer communication related to other projects took place over the ARPANET, so it was in effect an emerging infrastructure technology. This situation lasted throughout the life of the ARPANET, and when the experimental nature of it could no longer be justified, it was decommissioned in 1988 (Abbate 1999) .
Second, technologies derived from the ARPANET were developed to create networks for other needs in the public and private sectors during the 1970s. One of them, the X.25 protocol, became a Comité Consultatif International Téléfonique et Télégraphique (now known as the International Telecommunications Union) standard and was used by telecommunications companies to offer data-communication services. However, the sort of networks that emerged from these technologies were very different in character from the ARPANET because they reflected very different organizational goals (Rogers forthcoming). To meet these goals, the networks had to be endogenous or internal to the organization, no matter how large an area they served. None of these networks led to the next generation of technologies as represented in the Internet.
Third, several attempts failed to make the ARPANET into a broader network encompassing more than the ARPA contractors and grantees or even to privatize it to offer for-fee services. The critical issue in the emergence of the Internet as a broad infrastructure reaching the economy at large was an institutional one. It was only when the institutions of science led by the NSF in the mid-1980s built the NSFNET, inspired by the ARPANET, that a bridge was built and the possibility of such an infrastructure finally materialized.
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The key to the emergence of the Internet as a new information infrastructure during the late 1980s and early 1990s was the embedding of the computer-networking protocols in institutional carriers. These were mainly the government agencies most closely associated with federally funded research (primarily NSF and also DOD, the Department of Energy, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration) and their partners in the academic sector that routinely perform duties on review and advisory panels or lead major research programs in the R&D system. Therefore, it was not only the funding for inventing cuttingedge technologies that government provided in the development of the Internet as we know 18 See a more complete account of this process in Rogers 1998. it today. More fundamentally, it was the social networks and institutional arrangements in which the network was embedded that catalyzed the development of an information infrastructure that we know now as ''the Internet.'' Alternative paths of development were becoming visible during the early stages, especially via the role of large private companies such as IBM and Digital Equipment Corporation. These entailed more specialized privately owned networks that were mainly geared toward business services rather than broad public communication.
As a result, the current Internet, with its strong presence in the private sector as a realm of entrepreneurship and innovation, while at the same time strongly imbued with democratic or public interest values, is the congealed product of a government dynamic that took place over a period of about a decade. It is not the result of a top-down government program implemented by its officers. However, it grew out of a process squarely situated within the regular operation of government and a clear embodiment of public value as understood by its officers.
Success of Denial Stories and the Potential of a Public Story
The denial of public value is not the primary intent of these stories, and they are not all in direct competition with each other even though they present accounts of the development of the Internet that are incompatible in varying degrees. However, the net effect of these stories is that they all coincide in pushing the public sector to the background as a means to their own ends. Whether these stories have been successful on their own terms remains an open question. The questions of priority in invention are still ongoing, and the stories in the first set, for example, are more of a blueprint for claims to fame by various individuals than a single story adhered to by everybody that tells them. They are sometimes internal to the entire group of participants who are still active in technology development and tell the stories to each other in mutual admiration (Salus 1995, 259) .
In terms of the popular appeal of these stories, two significant background factors must be taken into account. On the one hand, the Internet is a new large-scale technological system that seems to embody the aspirations of a new era, just as electricity captured the imagination of people in the early twentieth century and the atomic bomb ushered in the Atomic Era. During the 1990s, the computer age seemed to be coming to fruition as we entered the twenty-first century.
19 It is also a new society-wide phenomenon that needed to be given meaning by the people. In this regard, the dominant question at this time seemed to be: ''Is this an instrument for freedom, democracy, and empowerment of ordinary people, or will it be used by the powerful, whether in government or business, to exploit the less powerful?''
The other background factor is related to the public perception of prior experience with large technological systems planned and implemented by government. The Tennessee Valley Authority system of electric energy, the Manhattan Project in atomic energy and weapons, and the space program are paradigmatic in this regard. Even though these were very successful government programs and were admired by the public, the counterculture movement that began in the 1960s and catastrophic events such as Three Mile Island and the Challenger accident have diminished these achievements in the eye of the public because of environmental concerns, suspicion of antidemocratic collusion in the ''military-industrial complex,'' and the perception of high risk associated with them (Hughes 1989, chaps. 8-9) .
The stories in the third and fourth sets clearly situate the new technology outside of the ''military-industrial complex'' and identify the Internet with the counterculture as both radically democratic and environmentally friendly. At the same time they are at pains to allay fears that we may be on the way to a technocratic ''big brother.'' They do so by showing the combination of technical skill, allegiance to the profession (i.e., ''disinterested'' knowledge), and grassroots democratic values the heroes of these stories embrace.
If one were to develop a public sector counterstory, it need not contradict the main points and intent of these stories. What seems to be desirable is a story that is as simple as the ones that we have identified and shows how public servants create public value. In reviewing the history of the Internet such stories can be found in spite of a lack of wider dissemination.
The closest things we have found to public sector counterstories are the ones insiders tell one another about specific public managers. The first two network directors at NSF, from 1985 to the end of the decade, Dennis Jennings and Steve Wolff, are prominent examples. They had to design and create a new network after ARPA failed to extend the ARPANET to the entire academic community and did so in a very short period of time (about three years), with very few resources and the skepticism or opposition of other government agencies and telecommunications and computer corporations. They understood the core values of their main constituencies and were single-handedly responsible for establishing the basic rules of membership and technical compatibility that allowed broad sectors of academic life and private industry to pursue their own interests on the network. Their ability to keep a very heterogeneous constituency together and mediate the tensions within it was the key to the social, political, and economic success of the system. In sum, they are our ''heroes'' as public managers who lead for the obvious benefit of others. They triumph over skepticism and opposition that come from unexpected quarters, sometimes quite close to home, as in the case of other government agencies. Finally, there is a moral to their story: that opening the game to broad participation and support, the basic values of democratic government in action, leads to solid system building.
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There are other individuals who deserve to be mentioned in this same vein, such as Robert Kahn and Vinton Cerf, who not only invented the TCP/IP rules but also had a prominent role in developing the network from positions in the public and private sectors. Lawrence Landweber, a professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison though not a public manager, almost single-handedly led the international expansion of the Internet during the 1980s acting in similar ways. David Mills provided the first network router, known as the ''fuzzball,'' for the new network because, again, the ARPANET routers were too expensive to be available for this program. His is a story of technical prowess and public service as he had to adapt the router to uses that came from the new social conditions of the network. The diversity of its constituency meant that not everybody was polite and considerate in using the network, and abuse had to be prevented. This was a significant technical challenge that went together with continuous and lonely support of the routers for 20 The events behind these stories are documented in the authorization hearings for NSF and other government agencies that had network programs during the years 1985-88. The story form presented in this section was given to us in interviews with several of the main participants. almost two years. This story is made of similar components: the heroic public servant, long odds for success with thankless opposition, and the moral that allowing for the buy-in of a diverse constituency even under very demanding circumstances leads to solid system building. These individuals are just a few among many.
It is probably unrealistic to expect these stories to gain the popularity and diffusion of the private stories. They were not sent out to compete for popularity with them in the first place. But they may serve an important pedagogical role if used in the context of exemplifying public management.
The most widely known stories focusing on the contribution of public sector individuals to the Internet have been about elected officials, such as Al Gore, who as a U.S. senator and later vice president championed the development of the Internet. These stories are tied to political fortunes, are generally viewed as examples of overreaching by a politician, and cannot really be distinguished from the image fashioning of a politician for election campaigns. Therefore, it is less a story of the creation of value by the public sector and more the portrayal of a specific politician attempting to be a visionary leader.
PRIVATE DESTINATION OF PUBLIC VALUE: MARKET CREATION AS PUBLIC VALUE
The particular way in which public administrators involved in Internet activities created public value provides an explanation for the emergence of stories ignoring or denying the contributions of the public sector. It does not seem that there has been a deliberate effort to distort the truth and propagate falsehood about the creation of the Internet. Rather, we have argued that these stories function as myths of our contemporary culture that work against the background of a paradox.
The Internet was the result of a fairly large government effort pulled together by a cluster of agencies that are at best loosely coupled through program managers, academics, and some industry partners. There was no single policy mandating that the government create the Internet as we now know it. Nor, as we have seen, was there a single institutional umbrella under which this work was pursued. More pointedly, even though the actual technological system that was to be implemented had clear implications for the mission of the government agencies involved, that alone would not have been a good enough reason to propose the set of federal programs that implemented the Internet. The most important element of the vision was the creation of new markets for informationrelated economic activity that could only emerge if a context of lowered risk for business was provided with solid government backing (NRC 1988, 35-36; U.S. Congress 1989, 32 ; U.S. Executive Office of the President 1987, 18). This policy statement did not emerge until late in the development of the technology.
The creation of an appropriate context for specific private economic activity was the form of public value that the participants envisioned would be realized with the Internet. Therefore, in terms of the Internet as a communications system, each participant had a strong sense only of his or her own vantage point with only a vague intuitive sense of the broader scheme of things. Consequently, public managers found the ambiguity of political goals to be high, which led to some interesting and contradictory decisions. For example, at several points in the development of the Internet, public managers made decisions deliberately aimed at having the broadest possible impact on the private sector. At the same time, other decisions were implemented to avoid giving the impression that the government was about to compete with private industry in the area of computer networks.
More importantly and somewhat ironically, the ultimate success of the public sector in the role it was asked to play would be manifest in a healthy information technology and services sector that leads the world without the need for the special intervention of government organizations. 21 The stories reported in this article clearly naturalize the success of the implementation of the Internet both on the technological implementation level and in the creation of multiple markets for information-related products and services with the government receding into the background.
The stories reflect the values and interests that are at stake once the space for new private activities has been successfully opened by government. In the absence of a clear link among policy, agency mission, and implementation, the explanations resort to other factors and sources.
The first two types of explanation, the role of the heroic individual and the primacy of a professional ethic, are supported by an outlook, common among technologists, that ignores how much the path of technology is shaped by institutional and policy background assumptions. Technologists generally perceive the negative influences of organizations and institutions when these interfere with technological goals they have set for themselves. Many analysts of the impacts of technology on society also assume that technologies are entities unto themselves that develop according to an inner logic as they overcome the resistance of nontechnical factors, such as organizational priorities and institutional or cultural practices. The large scale of this technological system and the fact that no single entity actually controlled each step of the development of the Internet, a deliberate government policy, meant that no individual gained an overall systemic perspective of its evolution through his or her participation. Therefore, their firsthand accounts do reflect the fact that they were part of a process that was much larger than their purview. The inference to an inner logic of the technology guiding its evolution is only a small step away.
CONCLUSIONS: SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE DENIAL OF PUBLIC VALUE
The case of the Internet demonstrates several challenges to establishing the value of public sector contributions. The first of these challenges stems from the low likelihood that the case for public value will even be made. In the case of the Internet the public managers who provided critical leadership roles tended to identify with their professional community or were unwilling to make a strong case for the value of public sector efforts. The modern civil service system in the United States has embraced professional standards as an integral part of delivering public service. In this sense, the identification of public managers with their profession is but a variation on this pattern. However, public values are not always in harmony with professional values. Demands for public accountability and political responsiveness can be grating to professional norms, as is often the case in these creation stories.
At the heart of these stories the state is a resource opportunity that can be used. But it is a cumbersome one that will extract from heroes, professionals, entrepreneurs, and even public servants time and effort to navigate meaningless rules. The public sector demands for accountability to the public are important but secondary to the primacy of 21 The implementation of network components was done via grants with explicit requirements for self-sufficiency and exit clauses after a certain period of time. This strategy is also used in the funding of multi-institutional research centers that must include industry partnerships. a technological vision, which, sadly, only enlightened, technically competent bureaucrats can hope to comprehend. In fact, technically competent public servants probably object to the tag bureaucrat being applied to their professional identity.
The second challenge lies in our capacity to establish value claims for public sector policies and programs. In part, this stems from the lack of a single policy mandating the development of the Internet. The specific public policies and programs formed to develop computer-networking technology do not sum up to the Internet. Although there is ample evidence that public managers envisioned and worked toward creating the technological backbone of the Internet, this was principally out of their professional identity. They accomplished their work through programs with more limited agendas. This does not provide a clear public goal against which to measure accomplishments. We do not even have a language that accurately describes the public content of the goals pursued by public managers.
Ultimately, the development of the Internet is a case of indirect government, where agencies bring together public and private resources for specific technologies whose benefits are designed (or at least hoped) to extend far beyond the immediate rationales for public support. This proved to be a particularly difficult setting for establishing value. Tales of the Internet offer wink-and-nod renditions of how individuals used one agenda to draw public funding, all the while pursuing their true cause. However, this loses sight of the fact that researchers had no place else to get the money except from the public sector in the early stages of development. Similarly, the government was needed to establish clear international standards for the development of technology. Finally, public managers were instrumental in encouraging the open architecture of the Internet. Teasing out the value of these public sector accomplishments across multiple policies and the multiple issue networks advocating specific developments of technology takes us to the frontiers (and beyond) of our current abilities to make such assessments.
The third challenge lies with whether political leaders and the public are willing to accept public sector claims of creating value. In the case of the Internet public managers were quite wary of making value claims precisely because they felt that (1) these claims were unlikely to be accepted and (2) if they were accepted, then this would be considered a good argument for ending public support for the program.
In the Internet creation stories public managers' concerns over the ambiguity of goals included practical considerations of demonstrating performance in an era of increased concern for accountability. The policies that mandated their work and the activities that they sponsored and encouraged were designed to achieve specific outcomes. But the policy context was one where it was clearly understood that large-scale positive benefits were expected for the private sector. Although their agencies were authorized to produce outcomes that were necessary to the achievement of this ambiguous goal called the Internet, they were not authorized to also produce sufficient outcomes to meet this objective. Managers were troubled by an assessment problem, where agencies may be subject to criteria for evaluation of activities whose objectives they alone cannot achieve.
The absence of the tale of the public in this narrative leaves us with an inaccurate starting point for the development of technology. It gives the impression that great ideas will win out if the researcher is clever enough. In fact, great ideas can also die on the vine if they cannot be translated into a program of research that draws the public sector's attention. Similarly, the absence of the public role in these creation stories presents us with a false context. The creation tales of the Internet engage in romanticism favoring technology and the private sector. Scientists and technologists do indeed work at the frontier of human knowledge. But in the twentieth and twenty-first century they are accompanied by the deep pockets of the public. The insider stories about the public managers who were able to realize the democratic ideal in the creation of decentralized networks show how involved and activist the public sector has been in order to achieve this result for the private sector. But the existence of these public sector counterparts does not seem to be accompanied by a natural venue for their diffusion.
